














The objective of this paper is to determine the variables that explain the geographical 
expansion and armed activity of Colombian irregular groups since the mid seventies, 
taking into account the role of the political, fiscal and budgetary decentralization and its 
effects over local governance. This period of Colombian history (1974-2004) has been 
graved by strong economic, social and institutional changes that have deepened 
particularly since the decentralization process of the mid eighties. In fact, this paper states 
that decentralization process transformed the conflict into a dispute over the local power, 
intensifying the use of violence in order to appropriate part of the public goods and 
resources, interfere the political process and consolidate the group’s territorial control. The 
analysis of the illegal group’s early activity (1974-1982) shows that the use of violence is 
explained by grievances such as poverty or inequality. However, subsequent years reveal 
deep changes in the illegal group’s strategic procedures in which the decentralization 
process have given them incentives to control the local governments by using violence 
(greed). The results demonstrate a strong and significant relationship between the 
intensification of the armed conflict and the greater political, budgetary and fiscal 
autonomy of local governments. In fact, the presence of local resources such as royalties 
and taxes triggers violence against politicians being more intense in the municipalities 
where the actions of the illegal groups are higher. 
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Econometrics. 
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CONFLICTO, DESCENTRALIZACIÓN Y GOBERNABILIDAD LOCAL 





Este trabajo tiene como propósito determinar las variables que explican la 
expansión geográfica y el aumento de la actividad armada de los grupos ilegales 
desde mediados de los años sesenta, teniendo en cuenta el papel de la 
descentralización política, fiscal y administrativa de los años ochenta y sus efectos 
sobre los líderes y gobiernos locales. El periodo de estudio (1974-2004) está 
enmarcado por fuertes cambios a nivel institucional, económico y social que se 
profundizan con el proceso de descentralización de los años ochenta. En 
particular, el trabajo sostiene que ésta ha trasladado el conflicto a la arena de lo 
local a través de un mayor uso de la violencia destinada a la apropiación de bienes 
y recursos públicos, control del proceso electoral y/o consolidación del dominio 
territorial en lo local. El análisis sobre los determinantes de la actividad armada en 
los primeros años (1974-1982) demuestra que el mayor uso de la violencia 
coincide con condiciones objetivas como la pobreza o la desigualdad. Sin 
embargo, los años posteriores a 1982 revelan un cambio estratégico en la acción 
de lo grupos ilegales –depredatoria-, donde la descentralización juega un papel 
central para la concentración de la violencia a nivel local. En general, los 
resultados del estudio revelan la existencia de una relación fuerte y significativa 
entre el escalonamiento del conflicto armado y la mayor autonomía presupuestal, 
política y administrativa de los gobiernos locales. La presencia de mayores 
recursos públicos como impuestos o regalías intensifica la violencia contra los 
líderes locales, en particular, en aquellos municipios donde hay fuerte presencia 
de grupos armados ilegales.        
 
 
Palabras clave: Conflicto armado, violencia, descentralización, gobiernos locales, 
econometría espacial. 
 
Clasificación JEL: C23, C24, D74, R12. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The Colombian armed conflict is one of the oldest in the world; it is only superseded in 
time by the Israeli-Palestinian and India-Pakistan conflicts, and it is the only ongoing 
armed conflict in North and South America. The end of the Cold War did nothing to reduce 
the military capacity of Colombian guerrilla forces. In fact, in the early-1990s they 
escalated their activities (attacks, combat, intimidation, etc.) to cover a greater proportion 
of Colombian territory. They financed their activities from a variety of different sources – 
kidnapping, extortion, illicit crops, theft of municipal funds – and became one of the 
“world’s most salient cases of the successful self-financing of insurgency” (Rangel, 2001). 
At the same time, paramilitary, or illegal self-defence groups, appeared to combat the 
guerrilla groups; they also scaled up their activities during the 1990s, financing them from 
similar sources to those of the guerrilla groups. 
 
The objective of this paper is to explain the variables associated with irregular groups’ 
armed activities from the mid-1970s, to determine the possible causes of their expansion 
until 2002 and to establish the relationship of the domestic conflict with municipal economy 
and politics. Over this 30 year period, Colombia experienced profound economic, social 
and institutional changes. Not only was the process of urbanisation consolidated at the 
same time as the participation of agriculture in GDP fell, but the process of 
decentralisation was accelerated. From the mid-1980s, regional and local governments 
had access to higher resources, both their own and from transfers; local politics was also 
transformed via the popular election of mayors.  
 
The decentralisation of local politics and public spending changed the State’s role, as 
much in terms of power as spending, and gave more political power to elected regional 
and local leaders, who now had greater budgetary autonomy. The new municipal and 
regional resources were spent largely in social areas (especially: education, health and 
clean drinking water). We state that the institutional changes of decentralisation had a 
substantial impact on the dynamics of the internal armed conflict. As political power and 
budgetary resources became more local, the irregular groups had more of an incentive to 
exercise greater local control, especially due to the State’s weakness in the monopoly of   4
force and the administration of justice. Thus, as the groups increased their local control – 
by intimidating, plundering and forming strategic alliances with local and regional leaders – 
they had access to a greater proportion of power.  
 
This document is divided into five sections, the first being this introduction. The second 
describes the temporal and geographical evolution of the Colombian conflict from 1974 to 
2002. The third looks into the possible links between the conflict and decentralisation. The 
fourth deals with the econometric evidence and quantitative exercises carried out on the 
variables related to armed activity and its expansion. The fifth develops the link between 
local politics and conflict and in the sixth section we present our conclusions. 
 
To reach an understanding of the long-term evolution of the armed conflict, we used new 
historical data, and new municipal economic, fiscal, social and political information. New 
IEPRI
1 municipal information on the activities and actions of the different guerrilla groups 
(FARC, ELN, M-19) from 1974 to 1982 was used, as were municipal databases (belonging 
to the Social Foundation, the National Planning Department and the Vice-President’s 
Office) related to the actions and attacks of guerrilla, “self-defence” and criminal groups 
between 1985 and 2004. During the quantitative exercises we combined this information 
with census data from 1973, 1985 and 1993, municipal fiscal accounts held by the 
National Audit Office and the National Planning Department, electoral information from the 
National Electoral Database, land ownership data from the Agustín Codazzi Geographical 
Institute, educational statistics from the Ministry of Education and the DANE, and criminal 
statistics from the National Police Force. 
 
2. The Geography and Evolution of the Conflict  
 
The activities of irregular groups increased significantly during the second half of the 
1980s (Graph 1), both in terms of armed activity (more attacks) and geographical 
expansion. Map 1 shows the municipalities in which an armed group was active between 
1974 and 1978
2. The total, 91 municipalities, is only a little more than 8% of the total 
                                                 
1 The information was collected from the following newspapers: El Tiempo (Bogotá), El Colombiano (Medellín), 
El País (Cali), La Patria (Manizales) and Vanguardia Liberal (Bucaramanga).   IEPRI is the Institute of Political 
Studies and International Relations of the National University of Colombia. 
2 The map shows FARC, ELN, EPL, M-19 and Nacional Liberation Front (FLN) activity. It also includes 
movements such as the United Revolutionary Forces of Colombia, the Red Guard, MAS, the ORP and the   5
number of municipalities at the time, a sharp contrast with the current percentage of 




Additionally, the characteristics of these municipalities have changed over time. Initially the 
illegal groups concentrated their activities on regions undergoing colonization – far from 
the country’s economic centres and in which there was a clear relationship between 
poverty, State absence and a guerrilla presence (Pizarro, 2004). From the 1980s, 
however, the location of guerrilla concentrations changed. They relocated to strategic 
zones with an abundance of natural resources and huge economic potential.
4 As Pizarro 
(2004, p. 185) points out “…the expansion of guerrilla groups over the past decade is 
directly related to controlling the production of diverse riches: areas dedicated to the 
production and processing of illicit drugs, zones rich in gold, coal, oil, bananas, cattle and 
coffee.”   
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MAO. The activities referred to are: attacks on population centres, threats, extortion, kidnapping, attacks on 
military installations and oil pipelines, ambushes and terrorist attacks. 
3 According to DNP data for 2002, 33.6% of Colombian municipalities experienced FARC activity, 11% ELN 
activity, l 7% AUC activity, and 41% actions by all three groups. 
4 According to Habaug and Gates (2002), if an armed conflict is about winning power, then armed activity 
should move into the centres of economic power (the capital). The length of this process depends on the size 
of the country and its geography (climate, topography).   6
We analysed the variables associated with illegal armed activity using the hypothesis that 
the expansion of the armed conflict was linked to the specific strategic objectives of each 
illegal armed group. Achieving these objectives depended on the groups’ finances and the 
institutional framework and State actions designed to stop them. The political 
decentralization and spending was an institutional change that allowed the irregular groups 
to win new territorial influence by intimidating or forming alliances with political and local 




Map 1. Armed Actions of Illegal Groups: 1974 - 1978 
 
                                              
Source: IEPRI Database 
 
To obtain a clear idea of the conflict’s dynamics one must differentiate between the 
groups. Each has its own strategic objectives, expressed by the different temporal and 
geographical expansion dynamics. The next section offers a brief account of the 
appearance and evolution of the most important illegal armed groups today (FARC, ELN 




                                                 
5 See Rubio (2002).   7
2.1 The FARC’s Evolution and Expansion  
 
The origins of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are rooted in the 
1950s. A number of peasant self-defence groups, under the influence of the Communist 
Party, appeared in areas such as southern Tolima, Sumapaz and the Llanos Orientales 
(Mejía, 2002). These groups were a direct response to political violence perpetrated by the 
Conservative Government during the era of partisan conflict known as la Violencia. 
Following the bombing of Marquetalia
6 by the army in 1963 and 1964, the peasant self-
defence forces transformed into the guerrilla movement (Vélez, 2000), first represented by 
the Bloque Sur following the 1964 Primera Conferencia Guerrillera (First Guerrilla 
Conference). The Second Conference was held in 1966, and giving origin to the FARC 
and decided to expand their armed activities to other areas of the country in a guerrilla 
war. Six new guerrilla nuclei were formed and the reactive defence strategy was replaced 
by a long-term direct offensive conflict strategy with the final objective of winning power. 
 
Four years later the FARC, now an organisation with 1000 men divided into ten fronts, 
redefined their long-term objectives to include the accelerated recruitment of militants, the 
formation of new fronts, the urbanisation of the conflict, and a military attack strategy. 
These objectives were ratified at the Seventh Conference in 1982. This meeting, according 
to many authors, marked a historic point in FARC history: Here began the accelerated 
increase in the number of fronts and the unprecedented expansion of their armed activities 
(see Maps 1, 2 and 3 for details of the municipalities where the FARC were active in 1985, 
1990 and 2000)
7. “The organisation went from ten Fronts at the end of the 1970s, to 26 
during the first three years of the 1980s.” (Escobedo, 1992). 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
 
                                                 
6 In 1964, under President Guillermo León Valencia, the army entered Marquetalia, El Pato, Guayabero and 
other regions, with the objective of wiping-out the guerrilla groups active there. “The guerrilla resistance in 
Marquetalia lasted until the end of 1965. During Operación Marquetalia, commanded by General Hernando 
Correa and co-ordinated by Colonel José Joaquín Matallana, 16 thousand soldiers entered the region with the 
idea of exterminating thousands of guerrilla fighters living there. The FARC appeared on May 27
th that year as 
a result of the military actions in the independent republics. On June 20 an assembly was held to decide on the 
first tactical and strategic lines of the mobile guerrilla forces, and give impulse to concrete plans of attack. They 
were 48 men. They approved the Agrarian Programme of the Revolutionary Movement and the Revolutionary 
Guerrilla Forces.” (Mejía, 2002). 
 
7 For a rigorous analysis of the FARC’s geographical expansion see Echandía (1999).    8
Maps 2, 3 and 4: The Evolution of FARC Actions 
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         Fuente: Fundación Social, Departamento Nacional de Planeación 
   
 
The Seventh Conference was a strategic turning point for the organization, and led to new 
patterns of armed activity and attacks – the urbanization of the conflict, the increase to 48 
Fronts, the identification of the Cordillera Central (Central Mountain Range) as the base for 
expansion, the creation of means of financing to support the expansion process, and the 
massive use of politics to win more popular support.
8. 
  
There are various reasons behind the geographical expansion of FARC activity, the first of 
which being the existence of stable and lucrative sources of financing (Salazar, 2005). 
Amongst their principal income sources were: the plundering of productive activities (oil, 
coal, gold, manufacturing, energy, transport, etc.), the bleeding of municipal finances 
(direct extortion or redirecting local investment), kidnapping and the drug trade. In regions 
where illegal drugs were produced the FARC established a “tax system” that covered all 
level of production (cultivation, processing and trafficking).   
 
The FARC achieved the goals of the Seventh Conference and created fronts throughout 
Colombia; their strategic deployment axis being the Cordillera Oriental (Eastern Mountain 
                                                 
8 According to Lair (2004) the FARC, and other groups, experienced an unprecedented qualitative and 
quantitative jump, or “strategic rupture”, at the start of the 1980s – huge increases in the number of fronts, 
geographical dissemination via a “centrifugal logic” and  the control of municipal life. The second “strategic 
rupture” occurred following the army’s attack on the Casa Verde (Green House) in 1990.    9
Range) (Echandía, 1999). This allowed them to expand their influence to highly strategic 
zones with huge potential economic reserves. The FARC achieved important military 
victories in Las Delicias (Caquetá) and el Billar (Caquetá), where they displayed a 
sophisticated capacity for attack (Pardo, 2004).  However, there were also political and 
military failures during the FARC’s territorial expansion. The strategic, highly mobile units 
of war capable of attacking and annihilating military bases and defending strategic 
territories
9, suffered following the modernization of the armed forces during the Pastrana 
Administration (1998-2002). This modernization – basically the strengthening of infantry 
brigades and military aviation, and the evolution of communications – allowed the army to 
retake the military initiative and obliged the FARC to go back to their strategy of guerrilla 
warfare (Rangel, 2001; Pardo 2004).  
The balance of the Uribe Administration’s first two years reveals new tendencies of war in 
Colombia, and there is evidence of a new guerrilla tactic. According to statistics presented 
by the Security and Democracy Foundation (2004), the groups are recurring ever more to 
ambushes and anti-personnel mines (attacks against troops) and are attacking military and 
police posts and bases less. This reflects a regression from the march towards a war of 
movements in the early 1990s, to a conventional guerrilla war since 1998. 
2.2 The ELN’s Evolution and Expansion  
 
A group of Colombian students inspired by Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s teoría foquista, 
formed the Brigada José Antonio Galán in 1962 in Havana, with a view to founding mobile 
guerrilla groups in Colombia. Two years later the Brigada José Antonio Galán became the 
National Liberation Army (ELN). Following the taking of Simacota in 1965 the ELN issued 
their manifesto, which included the working classes winning power and the fight against 
the Colombian oligarchy and North American imperialism. The ELN's first power bases 
were the jungle and frontier zones in south Santander, Bolivar and north-east Antioquia. 
The first stages of the group’s evolution were characterized by slow growth in the ranks, 
who operated in small, focused guerrilla groups and carried out “easy ambushes on the 
army and attacked small police stations.” (Peñate, 1997) 
 
                                                 
9 A war of movements consists of carrying out semi-regular operations against State forces over long periods 
of time, or attacking strategic military installations. This strategy comes before the war of positions, when cities 
are attacked and power is won.   10
During these years the group’s finances were weak, coming principally from peasant 
contributions, the theft of public sector payrolls and raids on the Caja Agraria (Agrarian 
Bank), and they constantly had to pull-back to new areas of the country (Medina, 1996). 
The ELN’s stable growth was interrupted in 1973 when they suffered serious defeats at the 
hands of the military
10. These defeats almost led to the group’s extinction (Medina, 1996). 
In 1983 the ELN held the National Meeting at which they designed new strategies aimed at 
reviving the group abandoning the foquista theory. Some of the strategies had already 
been used successfully by the FARC (increasing and expanding war Fronts and looking 
for new sources of financing) and they included the fact that the support of the population 
is fundamental to the success of expansionist policies.  
 




































Hombres Frentes  
                                      Source: Ministry of Defence 
 
Similar to the FARC, the ELN developed an organisational structure capable of collecting 
and investing the enormous economic resources that would allow the movement to 
recover and expand (Graph 2). The Domingo Laín front was the first to kidnap cattle 
ranchers and hold the big oil companies to ransom. The ELN began to occupy zones with 
great economic potential, especially those with large-scale energy and mining projects 
from which the group could obtain resources. Amongst these zones are Arauca, 
Casanare, Barrancabermeja, Guajira and Cesar (Peñate, 1997). 
 
This strategy led to rapid growth in the 1980s both in men and attacks. The movement 
went from having 350 men in four fronts in 1984, to 4500 men in 41 fronts in 2000, 
                                                 
10 One of the most important happened in Anorí, Antioquia, in 1973, when the army killed 90 guerrilla fighters, 
including a number of the organisation’s leaders.      11
allowing them to extend their armed activities to new regions of Colombia (Maps 5, 6 and 
7). However, over recent years the ELN’s military capacity has been damaged and its 
areas of influence have shrunk under pressure from paramilitary groups and the FARC. In 
cities like Barrancabermeja and Cúcuta the ELN has lost its influence in the face of AUC 
activity. The ELN also gave the FARC control of their territories of influence on the 








2.3 The Evolution and Expansion of Paramilitary and Self-Defence Groups 
 
Today’s paramilitary (self-defence) groups were formed at the start of the 1980s, when the 
Betancourt Administration (1982-1986) passed amnesty and pardon laws and decided to 
commence peace talks with the armed groups.
12 Medina (1990) explains how the 
                                                 
11 This is why some authors have stated that the ELN is facing imminent military defeat, and are thus exploring 
the political arena with their proposal (la Convención Nacional) for an eventual peace process with the 
Government (Pizarro, 2004).  
 
12 Law 35/1982 offered amnesty to the authors of political crimes (rebellion, sedition and political violence) and 
authorised financing for rehabilitation and reinsertion programmes for fighters, including land rights and 
                 1985                                    1990                                      2000    
  
  
Source: Fundación Social     -       Depa  rtamento Nacional de Planeación
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concessions granted by the Government as part of its peace policy were not well received 
in some regions. Landowners and cattle ranchers who had been besieged by the guerrilla 
groups decided to form self-defence groups who would fight subversion alongside the 
army. Various self defence groups sprang up around the country as a response to the 
guerrilla groups’ extortion and kidnapping.
13 All these groups had a common component at 
the start – they were financed by regional elites and some of their members were also 
members of the armed forces. Between 1994 and 1997, the groups underwent a process 
of unification which led to the creation of the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia 
(AUC), a movement unified under one command group made up of regional leaders.  
 
By the end of the 1990s, paramilitary and self-defence groups were active all over 
Colombia, having achieved great mobility and offensive power
14. According to the UNDP, 
by 2002 there were 22 paramilitary groups in Colombia operating in 28 departments. The 
number of AUC fighters also grew fast, from 3,800 in 1997 to 13,000  in 2003, reflecting 
the organisation’s strategy to extend its influence into all areas where guerrilla forces were 
in control (Maps 8 and 9). The AUC began a fight for strategic zones of economic 
importance to the guerrilla forces, such as coca growing areas in Urabá, Putumayo and 
south Bolívar and cities like Barrancabermeja (oil) and Cúcuta (Venezuelan border).  To 
gain control of these zones the AUC carried out selective assassinations and massacres 
(Graph 3) with a view to eliminating the guerrilla groups’ social support base in the regions 








                                                                                                                                                     
education. Law 49/1985 authorised the President to pardon people condemned of these crimes, with the 
possibility of extending the pardon to related crimes. 
13 Including the Castaño brothers’ Autodefensas de Córdoba y Urabá; the Autodefensas de Ramón Isaza in 
Magdalena Medio; the San Martin, Meta, Rice Growers’ Armed Groups; the Santander Cattle Ranchers and 
Traders’ Self-Defence Forces; the armed forces of engineers in the Valle del Cauca; the Autodefensas de 
Cundinamarca commanded by el Águila; and the armed groups of drug-traffickers in Arauca, Putumayo and 
Caquetá. 
14 There is a brief history of self-defence and paramilitary forces in Richani (2002)   13
Maps 8 and 9. The Evolution of Paramilitary and Self-Defence Group Actions 
 
                                        1995                                      2000 
 

















                                 Fuente: Departamento Nacional de Planeación   
 
 









1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Año AUC FARC ELN
 
              
          Source: Human Rights Observatory, Vice President’s Office. 
 
The AUC has achieved a high level of regional and local influence, both in terms of politics 
and the use of public sector resources. It has also won an important level of control of 
coca crops and drug trafficking in Putumayo, Nariño and the Caribbean coast, which has 
                                                 
15 A massacre is considered to be the killing of more than four people in the same place at the same time.   14
multiplied the AUC’s financial capacity (Díaz and Sánchez, 2004) The AUC are currently in 
negotiations with the Government, with a view to ceasing hostilities and demobilising. They 
are demanding recognition as an independent political movement, but links with the drug 
trade and criminal practices are hampering the negotiations (Pizarro, 2004).                       
 
3. The Decentralisation Process of Colombia 
 
In this paper we state that decentralisation reforms aimed at reducing poverty, increasing 
political participation and enlarging social services offered a great chance to guerrilla and 
paramilitary groups to expand their actions and gain territorial control. The reason is 
twofold: on the one hand, local governments have less repressive capacity than the central 
government so local leaders are more susceptible to intimidation, and on the other, as 
more resources are transferred to local governments the “pot” available for plundering 
increases. Decentralization has been, therefore, an opportunity for the illegal groups to 
widen their political influences and enhance their sources of financing.  
 
The next section details the most relevant aspects of decentralisation in Colombia since 
the mid-1980s in order give a background to better understand the relationship between 
such process and the conflict. We show how decentralization reduced the role of the so-
called “objective conditions” (poverty, inequality, lack of public and social services) of the 
conflict by generating unprecedented advances in social indicators, but that it also gave 
irregular groups new territorial control and finance opportunities.  
 
3.1 Decentralisation in Colombia 
 
The process of decentralisation in Colombia began in the mid-1980s. Its objectives were to 
increase the provision of local public goods and services and to strengthen municipal 
democracy. From the outset political decentralization was combined with administrative 
decentralisation. Until the start of the 1980s, the Colombian State was highly centralised. 
Spending decisions were taken by central government agencies and Congress acted as 
the mediator between the Government and the regions. The initial proposal for 
decentralization focused on three areas: politics, economics and administration. 
   15
The political component of decentralisation was designed to improve the closed political 
structure, characterised by the exclusion of broad sectors and political movements (Hoyos 
and Ceballos, 2004). According to the National Planning Department (2002), the political 
component had three objectives: to consolidate democracy; to develop participative, direct 
democracy; and to increase governance. In addition, regards the development of 
participative democracy, it was hoped that the bipartisan tradition would be eliminated and 
the participation of non-traditional political parties increased. 
 
The fiscal decentralisation initiative included reforms aimed at guaranteeing a minimum 
level of resources for local agencies, to enable them to carry out with their new roles. 
Automatic and semi-automatic transfers from central government were increased, 
resources were reassigned and new sectors were created for local development (DNP, 
2002)
16. The Government’s decision to give administrative responsibility to the 
municipalities led to sharp rises in local resources, especially from transfers. Graph 4 
illustrates the evolution of transfers as a percentage of GDP. Between 1982 and 2002, 
total transfers went from 1.9% of GDP to almost 6%. This increase was due principally to 
the increase in municipal transfers, which went from 0.5% of GDP to 3.1%, thus 
superseding departmental transfers. Local governments began to manage substantial 
resources, which made them an attractive source of financing for the irregular groups. 
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                                       Source: DNP, authors’ calculations.  
 
                                                 
16 Importance was given to the provision of drinking water, basic sanitation, culture, recreation, sport and 
subsidised housing, amongst others.   16
 
The decentralisation can be divided in two stages: the 1980s stage that includes a set of 
fiscal measures aimed at reorganizing and strengthening local finances and the popular 
elections of mayors. The second, following the 1991 Constitution, gave new impulse to the 
process of decentralization and made Colombia one of the most decentralized States in 
Latin America. The second stage was completed in the late 1990s with a set of fiscal 
reforms that further developed the Constitution and revised some of its articles. 
 
3.2 The First Stage: the popular election of mayors 
 
Decentralisation during the 1980s was characterised by a weak social and economic 
democracy that, in turn, made it difficult to strengthen politics. In addition, the army had 
lost its monopoly of force, and drug trafficking had severely weakened the justice system 
(Sánchez and Núñez, 1999, Echeverry and Partow, 1998). Local governments had a low 
capacity to act due to their weak fiscal base, low margin of political manoeuvrability, and 
slow progress regards social indicators. One must also add the presence of illegal armed 
groups, who constituted a sort of “embryonic State” in regions with minimal or no State 
presence (See Hoyos and Ceballos, 2004).  
 
The popular election of mayors from 1988 was one of the first, and most important, 
advances in political decentralisation. The first stage of decentralization followed an 
integral strategy that combined fiscal, political and administrative changes, with a view to 
generating a significant impact on the fundamental problem of legitimacy.  Amongst the 
fiscal changes outstands the fiscal reform of 1986 that established that 50% of the VAT tax 
should be shared with local governments in an amount depending upon the population of 
each municipality.  
 
3.3 The Second Stage: The 1991 Constitution and the Deepening of Decentralisation  
 
The 1991 Constitution formalized transfers to local governments and the popular election 
of mayors and governors, and laid the foundations of increased decentralisation, 
especially in terms of higher resource allocation for local governments.  This stage had 
tour principal facets (Alesina et. al. 2002; DNP, 2002): a) The Government had to transfer 
to local governments half of all resources collected; b) the bulk of the resources had to be   17
spent on health and education; c) elected governors and mayors had to administer their 
own resources and improve their fiscal situation; d) democracy had to be strengthened via 
the creation of participative mechanisms. The period in office of governors and mayors 
was increased from two to three years to improve local government continuity. Another 
component was administrative decentralization that gave local authorities the right to draw 
up and execute budgets, plan activities, authorise spending and sign contracts.  
 
In spite of the budgetary limits the process imposed, in many municipalities with a high 
presence of illegal groups the initiative became a lucrative alternative under the new 
system of “armed clientelism” (Pizarro, 2004). The decentralisation turned local 
governments into a centre of dispute upon its resources distorting the political and 
electoral process. According to Rangel (1997) “…the decentralisation that has helped to 
widen local democracy and to bring near the citizen and the State has been used both by 
paramilitary and guerrillas to seize local governments and reinforce their territorial control. 
The lack of justice effectiveness and scarce repressive capacity of local governments have 
contributed to such situation.”  
 
4. Decentralisation and the Expansion of the Conflict  
4.1. Methodology 
 
As the present study intends to determine the variables associated with the activity of 
illegal groups both in time and space (geography), the methodology used should be take 
into account those features of the data. Given the geographical nature of the dependant 
variables used in this investigation, there may be some correlation, be it with the 
dependant variable in neighbouring municipalities or the explicative variables related to 
municipal or departmental locations and neighbours. The activity of irregular groups in one 
municipality should be correlated with the activity of irregular groups of neighbouring 
municipality, with the social conditions of neighbouring municipalities or violence 
generating factors of neighbouring municipalities, and econometric techniques should be 
able to capture these relationships. Thus, the activity of irregular groups depends not only 
on the characteristics of each municipality, but also on the activity and values of other 
variables in neighbouring municipalities
17.  
                                                 
17 The spatial auto-correlation of the dependant variable is not contemplated by Standard econometrics (MCO, 
transversal cut); this violates the principle of independent observations. This incorrect specification generates   18
 
The model used is the following: 
 
Yi,t = ρ*W1* Ys,t + Xi,t*β + Xs,t* W1*δ + ui,t;  (1) 
 
Where  Yi,t  represents armed activity in municipality  i  in year  t,  Ys,t  represents armed 
activity in the neighbouring municipality s in year t,  the vector Xi,t  contains the explicative 
variables in municipality i in year t, and vector Xs,t contains the independent variables in 
neighbouring municipality  s.  The spatial correlation, expressed by parameter  ρ
18  
measured the multi-directional spatial dependence - all the regions can affect each other, 
which motivate the implementation of a contiguous spatial matrix
19 W1 (or spatial lag).  
 
The use of this type of methodology and the integration of a contiguous matrix in the 
econometric models allowed us to capture the spatial diffusion and the contagious effects 
of illegal armed activity, which means we can analyse the contagious effects of illegal 
armed activity in one municipality on another, as well as the influence of the independent 
variables of neighbouring spatial units on local dependant variables. We used spatial tobit 
models for the period from 1974 to 1982 to explain the rate by inhabitants (the number of 
illegal armed actions). For 1985 – 2002 we used probit spatial models to explain the 





                                                                                                                                                     
correlated residues, and thus invalidates the results of statistical inferences based on the t-student test and, at 
the same time, increases the R2 value.  
18 The spatial correlation is similar to the temporal auto-correlation observed in the time series. However, in 
time series this econometric problem is unidirectional; the past explains the present and can be easily resolved 
by the lag operator. In the spatial model correlation is multidirectional. 
19 A contiguity matrix for N geographical units of size (NxN) with zero diagonal values (one cannot talk of the 
vicinity of a geographical unit to itself) and the other elements of the matrix include vicinity criteria between the 
other spatial variables  Ni and Nj (for i≠j). These values are different according to the vicinity criteria used. If the 
matrix used is 1/Distance, the elements i and j of the matrix, for i different to j, fill up with the inverse of the 
distance between the two municipalities i and j, so that the furthest geographical units have lower values. If the 
matrix used is binary 1km, only those elements of the matrix where the distance between census sectors is 
less than 1km fill up, and the rest of the matrix is full of zeros. The diagonal is filled with zeros and then all the 
matrixes are standardised horizontally, so that each horizontal sum of the elements in the matrix adds up to 1 
(Moreno and Vayas, 2001).   19
4.2. The Data 
 
The different econometric exercises all have a dependant variable, whether it be the rate 
of illegal armed activity from 1974 to 1982, or the presence of activity (as a 1 or 0 variable) 
between 1985 and 2002. As mentioned above, we used tobit spatial methodology for the 
first period and probit for the second. This variable was constructed using IEPRI 
information on the activities of armed groups for the period prior to 1982. The data of 
activities or action of illegal groups were extracted from compilation made by Fundacion 
Social for the period 1985-1994 and since 1995 from the Observatory of Human Rights of 
the Vice-presidency and the National Department of Planning.  
 
The explicative variables for activity from 1974 to 1982 are municipal socio-economic 
variables, including unmet basic needs (UBN), sewerage, energy and education, from the 
1973 census. Municipal income and the presence of mining resources (gold) were used as 
variables of municipal wealth or development. The State presence variable was 
constructed using judicial efficiency, measured as the relationship between captures for 
homicide and the number of homicides (police data). The control factor for the history of 
municipal illegal armed activity was the intensity of the Violencia Tardía (1958-1962) 
calculated by Chacón and Sánchez (2004).  
 
The explicative variables for the presence or absence of the three most important armed 
groups from 1985 to 2002 have been divided into socio-economic variables (UBN, Gini 
land ownership coefficient, primary and secondary educational coverage), wealth and 
economic activity variables (oil, cattle, coca crops, municipal transfers), State presence 
variables (electoral participation, political representation, judicial efficiency), geographical 
variables, and temporal and spatial lag variables. As of Municipal Transfer it should be 
clarified that the Central Government do not transfer resources to the municipalities in a 
discretionary way.  If that were the case fiscal transfers may be endogenous to conflict. 
The transfers received by municipalities depend mainly on a set of fixed poverty indicators 
and population and therefore they can not be manipulated neither by the Central 
Government, the local government or the illegal groups. The data for the explicative and 
dependant variables was taken from different sources (the President’s Office, the National 
Planning Department, the Agustín Codazzi Geography Institute, the Statistics Institute and 
the National Electoral Office).   20
 
4.3. The Results  
 
The Early Actions of Illegal Armed Groups: 1974 – 1978 
 
The results of the econometric exercises designed to explain the activities of irregular 
armed groups from 1974 to 1978 are presented in Table 1. The level of armed activity from 
1974 – 1978 is positively associated with poverty, measured by the Index of Unmet Basic 
Needs (UBN), and inequality, measured as variance in municipal educational coverage. 
Primary educational coverage has a negative effect. State presence, measured by judicial 
efficiency, has the expected negative effect. The wealth variables, measured by per capital 
municipal tax collections and the presence of gold, have the expected positive value, 
although only the presence of gold is statistically significant. 
 
The results show a strong spatial correlation or contagious effect; 0.22 of the level of 
armed activity is passed on to the neighbouring municipality. The results suggest that if a 
municipality experienced violence during the Violencia Tardía (1958-1965) it was more 
susceptible to the activities of irregular groups between 1974 and 1978. 
 
The results corroborate the hypothesis that, at its outset, the conflict could be explained by 
exclusion and poverty, as explained by the statistical significance of the poverty and 
inequality variable. The conflict was centred on areas where the peasant self-defence 
groups, that were the seeds of the guerrilla movement, had formed at the end of the 1950s 
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Table 1. Rate of Illegal Actions (Tobit 1974-1978) 
 
The Actions of Armed Groups: 1985 – 2002 
 
The probability determinants for the presence of illegal armed actions (FARC, ELN and 
AUC) between 1985 and 2002 are presented in Table 2
20. The economic variables are all 
positive and statistically significant. A guerrilla presence, oil extraction and cattle farming 
all influence the probability of FARC armed activity. A similar thing happens with coca 
growing – it increases the probability of FARC activity in the municipality. Government 
transfers to the municipality have a positive, significant effect on FARC activity. Wealth 
and economic activity follow the line of thinking developed by Collier (2000), related to civil 
wars in various countries, and Bottia (2003) related directly to Colombia. 
 
We also corroborated the hypothesis that increased municipal resources and political 
power following decentralisation led to the conflict becoming a dispute for local power, and 
                                                 
20 According to Reyes (1999) areas of small landholdings in the Andean region have not suffered agrarian 
conflict since the mid-1980s. They have, however, been the object of guerrilla and paramilitary activity and 
there have been confrontations between these groups and the army. 
Socioeconomic Conditions
UBN  1.10   ***
Primary education Enrollment -2.59  ***
Variance of Education 0.70   ***
Sewage Coverage Rate 1.72   ***
State Presence 
Justice Efficiency  -0.88  ***
Economic Activity 
Gold Mines  0.38     *
Spatial Variable 
Spatial Lag  0.22   ***
Violence 
Late Violence (1958-1965) 0.32     *
Constant  -1.74   ***
Number of observations 942
Methodology Spatial  Tobit
Year dummies  Yes ***
***  significant at 99%,  ** significant at 95%,  *significant at 90%  22
that it facilitated a rise in armed activity. The State presence and political activity variables 
have the expected signs. The effect of judicial efficiency is negative and highly significant. 
Electoral participation and the level of mayoral support (the number of votes for the winner 
versus total votes) have a negative effect on FARC armed activity. High electoral 
participation and political support are indications of the legitimacy of local governments, 
and hamper, to a certain extent, the activities of illegal armed groups. 
 
In terms of the temporal dynamic (Table 2) there is a high level of temporal persistence in 
FARC municipal activity; a municipality that has experiences FARC activity in the past is 
likely to experience FARC activity in the present. The contagious effect is high and 
significant – the probability of FARC activity in a given municipality rises by close to 40% if 
the group is active in neighbouring municipalities. 
 
As of ELN, table 2 shows that socio-economic variables have no statistically significant 
effect on ELN’s activities, with the exception of the Gini property coefficient, which has a 
sign opposite to that expected based on the “objective cause” hypothesis. The explanation 
for this is similar to that of the FARC. Wealth and income (cattle ranching and municipal 
transfers) have a positive, statistically significant effect on ELN activity. Once again, the 
positive, significant effect of municipal transfers is a clear result of decentralisation. In 
terms of State presence and political development, both judicial efficiency and electoral 
participation have the expected negative effect on ELN activity, as they did with the FARC. 
ELN activity also has a very significant persistent (temporal dynamic) and contagious 
(spatial dynamic) effect, although less so than for the FARC. 
 
The models for AUC activity were generated for 1995 – 2002, due to the fact that 
systematic municipal information is only available for this period. Table 2 shows that socio-
economic variables have no statistically significant effect. Only poverty (UBN) has a 
negative effect. All of the wealth and resource indicators have the expected positive sign; 
the existence of oil, cattle ranching and coca crops all incentive AUC activity. Once again, 
the size of municipal transfers has a significant and positive effect on the activity of this 
group. State presence and local electoral participation negatively affect the probability of 
AUC activity, and were, in fact, of a higher (negative) magnitude than in the case of the 
FARC and the ELN.  
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The AUC temporal-spatial dynamics behave differently to those of the other two groups. 
Although there is strong temporal persistence (similar to the ELN and less than the FARC), 
the contagious effect is very low (just 0.013, compared to 0.38 for the FARC and 0.31 for 
the ELN). 
 
Table 2. Actions of FARC, ELN and AUC, 1985-2002  
Illegal Armed Group FARC ELN Autodefensas
Socioeconomic Conditions
UBN  0.0003 0.0003 0.0008  **
Gini of Property Value -0.1196   *** -0.0430    ** 0.0112
Primary Enrollment rate  0.0252   *** -0.0048 -0.005
Secondary Enrollment rate  -0.0391    ** 0.0019 0,0144
Economic Activity
Presence of Oil 0.0322   *** -0.0009 0.0294     *
Presence of Cattle 0.0454   *** 0.0199   *** 0.0382   ***
Coca Crops 0.0025     * -0.0015 0.0041    **
Transfers from Central Govt  0.0501   *** 0.0421   *** 0.0509   ***
State Presence
Justice Efficiency  -0.0872   *** -0.0687   *** -0.2242   ***
Electoral Participation  -0.1907   *** -0.0577   *** -0.1404   ***
Political Representation  -0.0894   *** 0.0261 0,0338
Geographical Variables
Altitude 0.0064  ** 0.0056 *** -0.0039
Distance to Deparment´s Capit 0.000 0.000 -0.0001
Spatial and Time Dynamics
Time lag 1 0.1850   *** 0.1331   *** 0.1679   ***
Time lag 2 0.0692   *** 0.0713   *** 0.0590   ***
Time lag 3 0.0759   *** 0.0722   *** 0.0349    **
Illegal Group's Space Lag 0.3893   *** 0.3102   *** 0.0135   ***
R
2 0.2504 0.3493 0.1561
Number of observations 13029 14070 5203
Methodology Spatial Probit Spatial Probit Spatial Probit
Year Dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Illegal Armed Groups Actions (Actions= 1, No Actions = 0)
FARC & ELN : Period 1985-2002; Autodefensas: 1995-2002
***  significant at 99%,  ** significant at 95%,  *significant at 90%
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4.4. An Explanation of the Conflict’s Geographical Expansion 
 
Changes in the Probability of Illegal Armed Actions 
 
Once we had completed the econometric exercises for the determinants of the illegal 
armed groups’ activities, it became necessary to analyse the relative contribution of each 
of the geographic expansion variables of the conflict in recent years (the increased 
probability of armed activity). We employed a simple decomposition exercise using the 
following equation: 
 
∑ − − − = − ) ( , , , i t t k k i t k t X X PORC PORC β  (2) 
 
Where PORC is the percentage of municipalities that experienced illegal armed activity in 
time t and t-i. This means that the change in the percentage of municipalities in which 
group k was active corresponds to the sum of the difference of each explicative variable 
multiplied by its respective coefficient βk. For time t average activity in 1998/2000 is used, 
and for time t-i average activity in 1988/1990.  
 
The FARC, for example, were active in 10% of municipalities between 1988 and 1990, a 
figure that rose to 29% for 1998/2000. Graph 5 displays the effect of each of the 
explicative variables on the increased probability of FARC activity. It can be seen that the 
variable with the greatest effect on the expansion of FARC armed activity was municipal 
transfers, an indicator of decentralization having provided higher resources to 
municipalities. The next most important aspect is the contagious effect, which shows that 
FARC activity tends to spill-over into neighbouring municipalities. The temporal 
persistence of FARC activity also explains, in part, the expansion of this group. 
Municipalities that experienced FARC activity in the past are more susceptible to 
experience activity in the present. The other activities that explain to some degree the 
increased probability of FARC activity are the presence of illicit crops in the department 
and weak municipal electoral participation
21. Municipalities in which political participation 
                                                 
21 The future weakening of electoral participation is due to the activities of armed groups (Sanchez and Díaz, 
2005). The way in which weak participation in previous elections facilitates the actions of irregular groups is 
examined.   25
fell experienced higher increases in the probability of FARC expansion. However, the 
negative, statistically insignificant socio-economic variables had little effect on the 
increased probability of FARC activity. 
  
Regards the probability of ELN activity from 1988/1990 to 1998/2000, it can be largely 
explained by municipal transfers, as seen in Graph 6, followed by coca growing and 
contagiousness. The socio-economic variables did not have an important effect on the 
increased probability of ELN activity in the period in question. 
 
Finally, the variables associated with the increased probability of AUC activity from 95/96 
to 99/2000 were municipal resources or transfers, the presence of coca growing and 
temporal persistence (Graph 7). The other variables had a lower impact. 
 
 
Graph 5. Change in Probability of FARC Actions: 1988/90 – 1998/00  
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Graph 6. Change in Probability of ELN Actions: 1988/90 – 1998/00 
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Graph 7. Change in Probability of AUC Actions: 1995/96 – 1999/00 
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5. Conflict and Local Governments  
 
5.1 The Effects of Conflict on Local Governments 
 
The increase and expansion in armed activity of illegal groups has come together with a 
dispute between paramilitary and guerrilla over the control of local territories and 
governments. By controlling them a group gains access to resources both to strengthen its 
military power and to increase its political influence either by intimidation or partnership 
that reinforces its economic possibilities. The geographical expansion of the paramilitary 
groups has coincided with the escalation of the guerrilla actions. In fact, the paramilitary   27
growth was the response of diverse groups (cattle ranchers, drug traffickers, urban 
business, etc.) to the predatory behaviour of guerrilla utilizing nevertheless the same 
depredatory tools than it foes (Ramirez, 2005).  
 
Nonetheless, the way in which both groups approach local governments and local 
economies is quite similar. To exploit rents from local economies both groups establish 
financial goals for their fronts in the rich region reached either through coercion or 
partnership (Ramirez, 2005; Romero, 2003; Rangel, 1997) to gain political power both 
groups threaten, intimidate, exile or kill leaders not willing to concede; to build military 
control both groups deployed militias or combatants ready to eliminate informants or fight 
enemy forces
22. The final outcome of the described process is the transformation of the 
domestic Colombian conflict in a struggle among the illegal groups to control local 
economy and politics.  
 
Stylized facts on the relationship between conflict and local politics 
 
As seen the decentralisation process coincided with greater intensity and larger 
geographical expansion of the domestic conflict. In particular, the municipal electoral 
process and the administration of local governments have severely restricted by the 
actions of the illegal groups. The statistics on threats, kidnappings, assassinations of 
leaders and government official are quite striking. In the recent past more than 500 
hundred mayors – around 50% of the total number of mayors- were threatened, forced to 
leave and had to run the municipality from the department’s (state) capital. Between 1988 
and 2004 322 mayors, 617 councilpersons, 347 local political leaders, 214 grass root 
leaders, 185 union leaders and close to 600 government officials were killed by all groups -
including government forces.  
 
According to graphs 8 and 9 the pattern of killings of local politicians changed over time. In 
fact they were quite high during 1988-1990 -term of the first elected mayors- but fell in the 
following years. In contrast the number of kidnappings (graph 9) to politicians rose in the 
second half of the 1990s particularly in the local election years of 1997 and 2000. 
                                                 
22 According to a chronicle of the journalist Juanita Leon (2005) the guerrilla’s control of a particular 
municipality began by sending small groups to the region who built ties with the local peasants and workers 
facilitating the arrival of more combatants. Then they attacked the police station getting rid of the police force. 
Thus, the town became unprotected and was easy to extort farms, business, etc., and overall to predate the 
local budget.   28
Apparently it was easier and more profitable to obtain favours and resources from local 
governments through kidnapping than through killing. By using such violent actions, the 
illegal groups influence local contracting and appointment of local officials that facilitate to 
seize part of the local budget (Rubio, 2002). Such practices have been labelled as “armed 
clientelism” (Rangel, 1997; Ramirez, 2005) 
 
The criminal actions against local politicians and leaders show that the decentralisation 
reforms of the mid 1980s and early 1990s transformed the domestic conflict both in scale 
and scope. Conflict escalated and expanded but at the same time turned into a dispute 
over the “local”. The opening of the political process, the promotion of citizen participation 
and the improvement of budget allocation –all of them consequence of decentralisation– 
were aimed at reducing the reasons of domestic conflict. The upshot was instead more 
violence.  
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Modelling attacks against politicians 
 
Table 3 present the results of an econometric exercise to explain either the presence of 
attacks against politicians (probit model) or the number of attacks (tobit model) in a 
municipality during the period 1988-2004. Given the geographical nature of the data the 
models were estimated using spatial and data panel techniques.  
 
The results show that if a municipality experienced attacks the previous year it will have 
less during the present year as the coefficient of “lagged attacks against politicians” 
reveals.  The government resource variables (royalties and local taxes) increased the 
probability that attacks take place. The larger the royalties and local taxes the higher the 
probability and the number of attacks. As of natural resources only the existence of gold 
mines is positive and significantly related to attacks against politicians. Neither oil nor coca 
coefficients are statistically significant. In the case of oil, royalties (that include oil royalties) 
pick its existence. Coca is not a government resource and it is not expected to be related 
with violence against politicians.  
 
Among the State presence variable “Justice Efficiency” (measured as the arrest rte of 
homicide) stands out. If justice works violence is deterred. By the same token if there is 
more political participation the violent actions against local leaders are reduced. The 
results also point that attacks against politician is more likely to happen in the more remote 
municipalities as the coefficients of “Distance to Main Markets” indicate. Finally the 
activities (presence) of all illegal groups are related to more attacks against politicians 
being all coefficients statically different from zero and having all of them more or less the 
same magnitude.  
 
In conclusion, the results demonstrate that the presence of local resources such as 
royalties and taxes triggers violence against politicians being more intense in the 
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Table 3. Attacks against Local Politicians 
 
               
5.2 Conflict and the Local Political Process 
 
In the last section we developed a model to capture how conflict is highly associated with 
the attacks against politicians (killings, kidnappings, intimidation), either mayors, 
councilpersons or other types of local leaders. In this section we will determine how those 
attacks affect the local political process. In order to control resources or influence local 
governments decisions the guerrilla and paramilitary groups should curtail local electoral 
competition letting to compete in elections those parties or candidates likely to concede to 
their interests. Hence in the municipalities in which attacks take place indicators such as 
TOBIT PROBIT 
Coefficient Coefficient 
Lagged of attacks against  -1.461 *** -1.599 *** 
Resource Variables 
Royalties (log)   0.025 **  0.012 *** 
Taxes (log)   0.251 ***  0.154 *** 
Natural Resources 
Oil presence   0.019  0.074
Gold Mines   0.037 ***  0.141 *** 
Coca crops (log)  -0.004 -0.046
State Presence 
Justice Efficiency  -0.001 *** -0.749 *** 
Electoral Participation  -0.008 *** -0.587 *** 
Political Representation   0.039 ***  0.298 *** 
Geographical variables 
Distance to Main Markets   0.106 ***  0.315 *** 
Distance to Department’s Capital -0.003  0.001
Illegal Groups 
FARC actions  0.059 ***  0.005 *** 
ELN actions   0.034 ***  0.005 *** 
AUC-Delinquency Actions  0.038 ***  0.006 *** 
Observations  14630 14630 
Rho  0.204 0.169
Methodology  Spatial Panel Data Spatial Panel 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Attacks Against Politicians,  1988-2004
Independent variables  31
number of parties or degree of vote concentration in the mayoral race should reflect less 
electoral competition. 
 
Table 4 present the results of a model explaining effective number of parties competing for 
a seat in the city council and percentage of votes obtained by the winning candidate to 
mayor office. It is expected that the greater the attacks the less the effective number of 
parties and the larger the percentage of votes of the winning mayor candidate. Taking as a 
left hand side variables the effective numbers of parties or the percentage of vote the 
winning mayor candidate in the local elections of 1988, 1992, 1994, 1997, 2000 and 2003  
we find that –after controlling for populations,  poverty and other local variables–in average  
 




Dependent variables  Number of Parties Electoral Concentration
Independent Variables  Coefficient Coefficient 
Socioeconomic Conditions 
Unmet basic needs  -0.003 *** <0.001 *** 
Primary Education enrollment rate  0.169 *** -0.001 *** 
Economic Activity 
Coca crops (log)   0.005 *** -0.003 *** 
Transfers from central Government  0.124 *** -0.001 * 
Geographical Variables 
Population (log)   0.208 *** -0.024 *** 
Distance to Capital  -0.053 ***  0.007 *** 
Illegal Groups Activity 
Attacks against politicians  -2.184 ***  0.254 *** 
ELN actions   0.076 *** -0.005 ** 
FARC actions  -0.023 ***  0.001 
AUC-Delinquency actions   0.008 *** -0.005 * 
Constant  -1.434 ***  0.726 *** 
Observations  6071 6098 
Methodology  1040 1026 
Two stage panel with 
random effects
Two stage panel with 
random effects 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  32
one attack against politicians
23 reduces in 2.1 the number of parties and increase in 25 
percentage points mayor electoral concentration. These effects are quite substantial since 
for instance in the 2003 elections the average number of parties of the more than 1000 
Colombian municipalities was around 3.18 (with 1.18 of standard deviation) while the 
percentage of votes obtained by the winning candidate in the mayoral elections was 50% 
(with 11% of standard deviation). 
 
The results also indicate that the direct effect of guerrilla or paramilitary actions on political 
competition is small. The regression coefficients of both guerrilla and paramilitary in the 
equation of number of parties are significant but tiny and not all with the same sign. As of 
the groups’ their direct impact on electoral concentration in the mayor race it is also small 
and only significant for ELN. In conclusion, the impact of illegal groups in electoral 
competition goes through their attacks against politicians. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
Since the mid-1980s the Colombian conflict has escalated rapidly, expressed as much by 
the number of attacks and level of illegal armed activity, as by the increased geographical 
coverage of their activities. Part of the explanation for these increases is in the improved 
sources of financing the groups enjoyed (kidnapping, extortion, illicit crops and drug-
trafficking). However, to better understand the dynamics of the conflict (especially 
considering its long-term nature), one must take into account the institutional changes that 
redefined the strategic objectives of the illegal groups. The most important change 
(starting in the mid-1980s) was the fiscal, administrative and political decentralisation 
process that turned the conflict into a dispute for local power. 
  
This study used conflict statistics dating back to the early-1970s. The evidence shows that 
until 1985 the number of attacks and municipal coverage were low – just 12% of 
municipalities experienced illegal armed actions between 1974 and 1982. The econometric 
evidence, in turn, shows that the conflict at that time (in terms of the activities of current 
guerrilla groups) can be explained to a large degree by socio-economic indicators of 
                                                 
23 The number of attacks was calculated as the annual averages during the previous inter election years. The 
variable was instrumented using the model of table 3 to avoid the possible endogeneity. For instance, if the 
mayor race is very much contested it may be that attacks are the consequence of the political competition 
itself.    33
poverty and inequality, and also by contagiousness and the violent tendencies inherited 
from La Violencia of the 1950s and 60s. 
 
From 1985 the intensity and geographical coverage of the conflict increased. This is 
explained by the fact that the guerrilla groups, constructed organisations that were capable 
of collecting and investing enormous the economic resources that came from substantial, 
stable sources (plundering productive activities, kidnapping and the drug trade). The AUC 
managed to consolidate their objectives in the fight to win control of strategic territories of 
great economic importance to the guerrilla groups, with whom they fought for economic 
resources whilst terrorizing the population via massacres and collective assassinations of 
groups they accused of sympathizing with the guerrilla forces. The results of the 
econometric exercises show that the greater part of the increased activity and expansion 
of the Colombian conflict since the mid-1980s (and especially in the 1990s) can be 
attributed to stronger sources of financing (greed), and very little to “objective conditions” 
(grievance) (Collier, 2000).  
 
However, this explanation of the conflict is a little hollow; it does not take into account the 
redefinition of the groups’ strategic objectives, nor the way decentralization modified the 
means to achieve them. In fact, the entire rationality of action in the fight for power 
changed when the institutional framework of the State they were trying to destroy changed 
– when power is decentralized, and transferred to local institutions, it becomes more 
vulnerable to external influences.  
 
The results confirm that the variables connected to municipal politics, electoral 
participation and popular support for mayors determine the presence or not of illegal 
armed activity. This, in turn, shows that there is a clear relationship between the armed 
conflict and political decentralization. In addition, the empirical results and the 
decomposition exercises reveal a strong connection between greater local government 
independence and fiscal strength and the intensification of the conflict. This corroborates 
our hypothesis that decentralization turned the conflict into a dispute for local power, 
manifested in the use of violence to gain control of public goods and services, influence 
political and electoral results of interest to the irregular groups, and consolidates local 
territorial control 
   34
The statistics show that in a high number of municipalities the electoral process and 
government management were seriously restricted by the political violence meted out 
against candidates, functionaries and leaders – and that the violence shot up from 1988, 
the first year mayoral elections were held. Local government management was restricted 
by pressure from the armed groups and “armed clientelism” appeared (using violence to 
appropriate State resources). Thus, the illegal armed groups controlled (and continue to 
control) the distribution of public spending and municipal investment. The econometric 
results point out that amount of royalties and taxes triggered violent actions against local 
politicians and leader and, at the same time, these violent actions affect the results of the 
local electoral process.   35
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